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Abstract— In this work, we evaluate the performance of
802.11p-based vehicular communications in the presence of
RF jamming attacks. Specifically, we characterize the trans-
mission success rate of a car-to-car link subject to constant,
periodic, and reactive RF jamming. First, we conduct extensive
measurements in an anechoic chamber, where we study the
benefits of built-in techniques for interference mitigation. In ad-
dition, we identify that the periodic transmission of preamble-
like jamming signals can hinder successful communication
despite being up to five orders of magnitude weaker than
the signal of interest. We further provide the rationale behind
this remarkably high jammer effectiveness. Additionally, we
quantify the impact of reaction delay and interference signal
length on the effectiveness of the reactive jammer. Next, by
means of outdoor measurements, we evaluate the suitability
of the indoor measurements for being used as a model to
characterize the performance of car-to-car communications
in the presence of RF jamming. Finally, we conduct outdoor
measurements emulating a vehicular platoon and study the
threats that RF jamming poses to this VANET application.
We observe that constant, periodic, but also reactive jammer
can hinder communication over large propagation areas, which
would threaten road safety.
I. Introduction
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have recently at-
tracted the interest of researchers and industry due to their
potential to improve road safety [1] and traffic coordina-
tion [2]. The packets exchanged by these applications require
timely and reliable delivery which poses a real challenge to
VANETs due to the impairments of the vehicular wireless
channel. To partially address these issues, standardization
efforts have meanwhile lead to the approval of the IEEE
802.11p amendment [3]. For this amendment, the 802.11a
Physical Layer (PHY) was modified by reducing the channel
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bandwidth from 20 MHz to 10 MHz to better cope with
multipath fading. Further features enhancing the reliability
were the choice of the dedicated 5.9 GHz frequency band as
well as the design of a prioritized channel access for critical
messages. In the research domain, various works [4], [5]
studied reliability enhancing measures, such as the use of
short packets and robust modulation and coding schemes.
Except for higher-layer security threats, which have been
studied for example in [6] and [7], VANETs appear to be
quite reliable from a standardization and research point of
view with respect to safety-critical messaging. However, the
impact of radio frequency (RF) jamming on VANETs has
not been studied so far. With the proliferation of powerful
software-define radio platforms that are capable of interfer-
ing 802.11p networks [8], RF jamming could compromise
road safety. RF jamming has been extensively studied in the
context of classical 802.11 networks without accounting for
the particularities of car-to-car communications. Besides the
differences in PHY design of 802.11p compared to other
802.11 amendments, the propagation conditions of VANET
are fundamentally different due to the highly dispersive and
rapidly changing vehicular environment. Hence, we expect
differences in the impact of jamming and, therefore, experi-
ments in representative vehicular scenarios are necessary to
characterize the vulnerability of VANETs and its geographic
extension. This paper addresses this short-coming and, in
detail, we contribute the following:
1) We provide a thorough experimental evaluation of the
performance of 802.11p devices under the impact of
RF jamming in an anechoic chamber. We significantly
extend our earlier work [8] by increasing the granular-
ity of the measurements and by accounting for a larger
variety of jamming signals. In particular, we consider
a constant, a periodic, and a reactive jammer. Among
other findings, we show that periodic jamming signals
can impair communication up to an SINR of 56 dB.
2) We present a detailed description of the packet detec-
tion procedure of a reference 802.11p implementation
in an Atheros chipset. We identify the elements that
are most vulnerable to RF jamming, namely preamble-
triggered false signal detections and dynamic range
overflow at the analog-to-digital converter. Our mea-
surements and observations extend earlier works [9].
3) We propose a methodology for using the performance
characterization carried out indoor as a tool for model-
ing the behavior of 802.11p networks in the presence
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of RF jamming. We apply the model to predict the per-
formance of two communicating nodes in a vehicular
environment and observe a high agreement between
predicted and measured performance in the field.
4) We evaluate the impact of different RF jamming sig-
nals on a vehicular platoon by means of measurements.
We confirm our earlier observations in [8] that any
of the considered RF jamming attacks can effectively
disrupt transmissions within a platoon over a large
area. Particularly alarming are the dimensions of the
communication blackout area caused by constant and
periodic jammers, which can span more than 400 m in
an open field environment.
5) We provide the outdoor data used in our earlier
paper [8] and both indoor and outdoor data used
in this paper. The data is available for download in
crawdad [10] and [11] to foster the re-use and fast
progress on the topic.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we briefly describe the main PHY and Medium
Access Control (MAC) layer characteristics of 802.11p.
Furthermore, we introduce the selected 802.11p devices
and review the main packet reception steps and vendor-
specific interference mitigation techniques. In Section III,
we describe the setup and methodology chosen for the
measurements in the anechoic chamber and present the
results obtained in the presence of constant, periodic, and
reactive jammer. Section IV reproduces, in an open field
environment, the measurements carried out in the anechoic
chamber. We show that the indoor results can be used as
a model to precisely predict the achievable performance of
two vehicles in the presence of RF jamming. In Section V,
we highlight the threats that RF jamming poses to a vehicle
platoon and observe a complete communication disruption
over large propagation areas, specially in the presence of
non-reactive jamming signals. Finally, in Section VI we
provide an overview of related work before we conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly summarize the IEEE 802.11p [3]
standard which is part of the Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments (WAVE) standard [12] and defines PHY and
MAC functionalities. We further provide a description of the
devices used in our measurements. Background information
and descriptions are provided for the later presentation and
discussion of our results.
A. IEEE 802.11p
IEEE 802.11p is an amendment for vehicle-to-vehicle and
vehicle-to-infrastructure communication. It is based on the
802.11a amendment with some modifications, as shown in
Table I, which are intended to increase the robustness of
the transmission in highly dispersive vehicular environments.
Communication takes place in the 5.9 GHz band, which
is also known as Dedicated Short-Range Communication
Parameter 802.11p 802.11a
Frequency band 5.9 GHz 5.2 GHz
Channel bandwidth 10 MHz 20 MHz
Subcarrier spacing 156.25 kHz 312.5 kHz
Data rates 3 to 27 Mbit/s 6 to 54 Mbit/s
Slot/SIFS/DIFS time 13/32/58 µs 9/16/34 µs
Preamble duration 32 µs 16 µs
PLCP header length 8 µs 4 µs
Symbol time 8 µs 4 µs
TABLE I
Comparison of 802.11p and 802.11a PHY and MAC parameters.
(DSRC) band. The latter is divided into one control channel
(CCH) and a variable country-specific number of service
channels (SCH). For instance, six and four SCHs are defined
in the US [13] and in Europe [14], respectively. Each channel
is split into 64 OFDM subcarriers, of which 48 are used
for transmitting data, while 4 are used for time/frequency
synchronization and channel estimation (pilot subcarriers).
The remaining 12 subcarriers are disabled to accommodate
the frequency guard bands of the signal.
Beacon frames are broadcast over the CCH to advertise
services offered on specific SCHs. In addition, the CCH is
used for the transmission of safety messages. The access to
CCH/SCH is done in a FDMA/TDMA fashion as specified
by the Multi-Channel Operations of IEEE 1609.4 [12]. The
latter mandates an equally distributed access time between
CCH and SCH. Specifically, out of every 100 ms, 50 ms
are allocated for transmitting and receiving on the CCH,
while the remaining 50 ms are used for communication on
the SCH. Hence, the overall network performance strongly
depends on a correctly functioning CCH.
Every 802.11p packet consists of a preamble and PLCP,
MAC, and WSMP (WAVE Short Message Protocol) head-
ers, as illustrated in Figure 1. This control information is
followed by a variable amount of payload data. 802.11p
supports different modulation and coding combinations. Out
of these different combinations, the PLCP header is trans-
mitted using the most robust one, while MAC and WSMP
headers are transmitted with the same modulation and coding
as used for the payload. In general, the use of a robust
modulation and coding combination is recommended to
increase reliability at the cost of lower transmission rates [4].
The preamble consists of ten short training symbols, a guard
interval, and two long training symbols and has a total
duration of 32 µs. The format of the preamble is shown
in Figure 2. During the short training phase, a known bit
sequence is transmitted with a periodicity of 1.6 µs over
12 subcarriers evenly distributed over the bandwidth. This
information is exploited to detect the signal, calibrate the
automatic gain control (AGC), perform coarse frequency
offset estimation, and synchronize the clocks of sender
and receiver. The two long training symbols employ 52
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Fig. 2. Format and timing of a default 802.11p preamble and PLCP header.
subcarriers to transmit a different bit sequence that is used to
estimate the channel state and perform a fine frequency offset
estimation and a fine time synchronization. The preamble is
followed by the PLCP header which contains information
about the modulation used to transmit MAC header and
payload (RATE field). It further tells the receiver how long
the remaining transmission is going to last (LENGTH field).
A parity bit is also available to detect errors in the previous
PLCP header fields. If the parity bit indicates that the PLCP
header is free of errors, the receiver continues decoding user
data for the time indicated in the LENGTH field.
The medium access in 802.11p is organized according
to the standard CSMA/CA protocol. If a node wants to
transmit a packet, it must first sense the medium idle for
a certain time interval. The medium is considered idle if
the detected energy is below the carrier sense threshold.
Although the value of this threshold is not standardized,
it is typically set equal to the receiver sensitivity. Some
commercial 802.11 devices do not consider the medium busy
if they cannot detect a legitimate signal [9], [15], which
is the case with the 802.11p devices that were used in
our experiments. This reported behavior does not conform
with the 802.11 standard, as the latter indicates that the
carrier sense threshold should be increased by 20 dB in the
cases where the preamble portion has not been detected (see
Clause 18.3.10.6 in [16]).
B. Measurement Equipment: IEEE 802.11p Device
We use NEC Linkbird 802.11p [17] devices as sender and
receiver in all our experiments. These devices are the result
of several vehicular communication projects funded by the
European Commission and the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research [18]–[20]. The Linkbird devices are
reference implementations of the WAVE standard and have
been widely used in VANET experiments [21], [22]. The
network interface cards of the devices feature an Atheros
chipset (AR 512) with Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)
version 0.9.17.1.
1) Details of the Packet Reception Process: Packet recep-
tion in current WLAN devices is a complex process that con-
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Fig. 3. Typical analog reception chain in 802.11 devices [23].
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Fig. 4. Automatic gain control logic blocks [23].
sists of various concatenated steps, namely automatic gain
control, signal detection, time and frequency synchroniza-
tion, and signal demodulation. In the following, we provide a
detailed description of these steps in a commodity (Atheros)
device. This information is relevant for understanding the
performance impairments caused by interference signals.
a) Automatic Gain Control (AGC): Any signal that
reaches the receive antenna (either noise, interference, or
user information) enters the reception chain as shown in
Figure 3. The radio signal is first amplified, then mixed
down to intermediate frequency (IF) and amplified again.
The signal is then split into complex components, which
are mixed down to baseband (BB) where they are low-
pass filtered and amplified. Both quadrature (Q) and in-
phase (IP) components are digitized by the corresponding
analog-to-digital (A/D) converters. Next, a power detector
estimates the power after A/D conversion. This computation
is completed rapidly (within one short training symbol [23])
and, if necessary, used to perform coarse gain adaptations in
the analog domain, see Figure 4.
Although the dynamic range of the A/D converters is
typically large (e.g., 70 dB [24]), the power of incoming
802.11 signals may span over an even larger range. Hence,
additional adjustment steps are needed to bring the signal
strength within the preferred range of the A/D converter,
which is limited by the so-called coarse-high and coarse-low
thresholds [23]. This range is significantly smaller than the
full A/D converter range to avoid two potential problems:
First, that the incoming power exceeds the upper A/D
converter threshold leading to the distortion of the signal.
Second, that the incoming power is not sufficiently above the
lower A/D converter threshold, which reduces the reception
quality due to a high quantization noise. If the detected
power exceeds the coarse-high threshold, the analog gain is
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significantly reduced to bring the signal back in range (e.g.,
by 17 dB [23]). Similarly, if the signal power falls below the
coarse-low threshold additional amplification is triggered. In
the particular case that the incoming power saturates the A/D
converter often enough, a quick and aggressive analog gain
reduction (e.g., 30 dB [23]) is performed to bring the signal
back in range. The value for the coarse-high threshold is said
to be between -70 and -60 dBm in [25] and between -65 and
-61 dBm in [24]. Although we cannot confirm these values,
the measurements presented in Section III suggest that our
802.11p devices use a threshold within the latter range.
b) Packet Detection: Once the incoming signal is
within the preferred input range at the A/D converter, the
receiver tries to detect the presence of a signal of interest.
First, it has to be determined if the incoming signal is in-
band or if it has been transmitted on a different channel
and, hence, it is not intended for the receiver. This is
done by comparing the digitized power at the output of
the A/D converter with the power measured after low-pass
and decimation filter [23], see Figure 4. If the signal is
determined to be in-band, it can be detected by means of two
independent methods, which are correspondingly triggered
depending on the power of the signal.
Strong signal detection is triggered by the sudden in-
crease in signal power that forces the reduction of analog
gain as previously described. Weak signal detection is
triggered to identify low-power signals that are in the range
of the background noise power. The receiver looks for
sequences with a periodicity of one short training symbol
and compares the normalized self-correlation of a received
sequence against a threshold. If the threshold is exceeded
and a sudden increase in in-band power has been detected,
the presence of a signal of interest is assumed. The packet
detection phase is completed after a number of fine gain
adaptations so that the signal is placed at the preferred level
of the A/D converter. Finally, the selected gain is kept fixed
for the remainder of the incoming signal.
c) Synchronization and Demodulation: Prior to extract-
ing the payload, time and frequency synchronization are per-
formed using the short and the long training sequences. Next,
the receiver extracts information from the PLCP header
about the modulation used for transmitting the payload and
the total length of the remaining packet. The PLCP header
further contains a parity bit used to detect errors in the header
itself. If no errors are detected, the receiver demodulates
payload bits for the specified time. As our jamming signal is
an OFDM signal carrying modulated random bits (explained
later in this section), the receiver extracts bits from the signal
that do not carry meaningful information. Depending on the
value of the bit decoded at the position that corresponds to
the (expected) parity bit and on the value of the previously
decoded bits, the receiver may declare the presence of non-
valid or a valid OFDM transmission. In the latter case, the
receiver can be kept busy for an unknown time.
2) Interference-related Adaptation Schemes for Packet
Detection: Interference signals can block successful trans-
mission and reception in WLAN. They refrain the transmitter
from accessing the medium, hamper an accurate amplifier
gain configuration resulting in a reduction of signal quality
or distortion of the signal, and impair signal detection. For
instance, this latter issue is addressed by the Atheros pro-
prietary ambient noise immunity (ANI) technique [26]. An
interfering signal can trigger strong or weak signal detection
as already described. In both cases, the receiver has means
to determine the presence of interference (e.g., by detecting
framing errors based on the parity bit of the PLCP header
or by observing a low self-correlation value) and stop the
reception process. However, by locking onto the interference
signal, the receiver may miss the arrival of a legitimate
packet. The ANI mechanism increases the robustness to this
problem as follows: If the rate of false packet detections
exceeds a certain threshold, the immunity is increased by
reducing the sensitivity of the receiver. If, after the adapta-
tion, the rate of false packet detections falls below a different
threshold, the sensitivity can be progressively increased [26].
On the contrary, if the highest immunity level does not
prevent the rate of false packet detections from exceeding
the latter threshold, the OFDM weak signal detection block
is disabled. Next, if the rate of false packet detections falls
below the threshold, weak signal detection is enabled again,
but a higher in-band power is mandated for triggering signal
detection. Note that switching off the weak signal detection
scheme may cause the receiver to ignore (weak) legitimate
transmissions resulting in performance degradations [15].
3) Noise Floor Measurement and Adaptation: Atheros
chipsets use the measured noise floor of the circuits as
reference value to perform accurate measurements of the
absolute signal strength. The noise floor present at the A/D
converters consists of the thermal noise at the antenna plus
the noise of the RF front end (or noise figure) [23]. The latter
component is very stable against temperature changes and is
measured during the AGC calibration phase, where the re-
ceiver circuits are isolated from the antenna. The periodicity
of this calibration can be indicated in software and typically
corresponds to 30 seconds [25]. Next, during operation,
the receiver measures the environmental noise. Specifically,
noise measurements are performed over short time spans
during idle time, i.e., while the device is neither transmitting
nor receiving any signal. To obtain the absolute power value
at the antenna, the analog gain is subtracted from the power
observed after A/D conversion and normalized based on
the calibrated noise power. Then, when a signal of interest
arrives at the receiver, the power observed at the A/D output
is corrected by subtracting the analog gain and the measured
noise floor. The signal power is reported via the received
signal strength indicator (RSSI), which in Atheros chipsets
is an expression of the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio
(SINR). The RSSI is expressed in dB (relative to the noise
power) and obtained once per packet based on the power
measurement performed after the AGC settling time.
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C. Jamming Equipment and Profiles
There are different ways of implementing a jammer for
802.11 networks. If protocol-compliant jamming is studied,
the typical approach is to use off-the-shelf network inter-
face cards and tune protocol parameters accordingly, for
example, by disabling CSMA/CA carrier sense or back-off
deferrals [27], [28]. Alternatively, one can also study the
impact of jamming devices that do not comply with the
802.11 standard, which is the approach taken in this work.
We use Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP)
for implementing different jamming profiles [29]. The WARP
boards are software-defined radios where the physical layer
processing is realized on FPGA, while the higher layer
processing is performed on an integrated PowerPC core. The
WARP board provides an 802.11-like OFDM physical layer
with a 10 MHz bandwidth. The transceiver of the boards [30]
supports transmission at frequencies up to 5.875 GHz, hence,
covering two 802.11p channels [3] (i.e., channels 172 and
174). The board is designed to provide a maximal output
power of 18 dBm in the 2.4 GHz band. As the transmit power
in the 5.9 GHz band is not specified, we measured it with a
spectrum analyzer and found it to be 16.75 dBm. The OFDM
signals transmitted in the default WARP implementation
do not comply with the 802.11p standard as the PLCP
header fields, among others, differ from the specifications.
Furthermore, the transmitted WARP signals do not block
medium access. It has been reported [9], [15] that certain
commercial 802.11 devices (including our Atheros cards)
consider the medium as busy only if they detect a standard
compliant transmission. As already discussed, this design
does not comply with the 802.11 standard.
Based on the WARP boards, we implement three different
jamming profiles, namely periodic, constant, and reactive.
1) Periodic Jammer: The periodic jamming signal is
characterized by a 64 µs ON phase and a 10 µs OFF phase,
see Figure 5. The frame format of the periodic jammer con-
sists of a basic zero-payload WARP frame as illustrated in
Figure 6. The PLCP and MAC headers are both transmitted
with a QPSK modulation.
2) Constant Jammer: The constant jammer is intended
to be continuously transmitting a signal. Realizing this with
the WARP boards is, however, not entirely possible. The
amount of time that the device can be transmitting is upper-
bounded. We determined this time with an oscilloscope to
be 2.71 ms. Furthermore, there is an unavoidable 10 µs idle
gap between two consecutive transmissions required by the
hardware to set up a new transmission. Still, this results
in a jammer with very long active periods such that, in
the following, we consider it as a constant jammer. To
transmit the signal, random payload is generated to make
up for the aforementioned 2.71 ms of transmission time.
The random payload and the headers are transmitted with
a BPSK modulation. Figure 5 illustrates the constant and
periodic jamming profiles in the time domain compared to
a regular 802.11p frame. Note that the time relations in the
figures are not to scale.
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Fig. 5. Constant and periodic jammer profiles in the time domain compared
with a default 802.11p transmission.
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Fig. 6. Frame format of the jamming signals generated by the WARP
device. Short interference signal with a 64 µs duration (Fig. 6(a)) for the
periodic jammer, and long interference signal with a 2.71 ms duration
(Fig. 6(b)) for the constant jammer.
3) Reactive Jammer: The reactive jammer is designed
to start transmitting upon sensing energy above a certain
threshold. The default OFDM design of the WARP platform
features an energy detection block, which compares the
instantaneous energy measured at the receive antenna with a
threshold. We set the latter to -75 dBm as we empirically de-
termined it to be a good trade-off between jammer sensitivity
and false transmission detection rate1. If the detected energy
exceeds the threshold during a certain time span (Tdetect), an
ongoing 802.11p transmission is assumed by the jammer. We
set Tdetect to 2 µs to avoid reacting to sporadic noise power
peaks. Then the WARP device has to switch from idle to
transmit mode, which introduces a delay of 10 µs. Hence,
the minimum reaction delay corresponds to 12 µs and it
can be increased in microsecond granularity. In comparison
to previous reactive jammers [31], our design features the
shortest reaction time. By appropriately tuning the reaction
delay, the duration of the jamming signal (Tsignal), or by
adding sleep time phases several reactive jamming patterns
can be obtained, most of which are illustrated in Figure 7.
In this work, we consider a reactive jammer that emits a
single signal per (detected) 802.11p frame. The reactive jam-
1Setting the detection threshold closer to the sensitivity of the device
would have lead to the reactive jammer being constantly triggered by
background noise, other sources of interference, and delayed copies of the
jammer signal itself. We observed this behavior in outdoor measurements
and increased the threshold to avoid the consideration of a reactive jammer
that was practically acting as a constant one.
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Fig. 7. Reactive jammer profiles in the time domain compared with a
default 802.11p transmission.
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ming signal is basically characterized by the tuple (Treaction,
Tsignal). The different configurations result in different start
and end points of the attacks as illustrated in Figure 8.
III. Indoor Evaluation
Before bringing our equipment to the field, we performed
a set of measurements in an indoor environment to charac-
terize the 802.11p devices. For this purpose we used a 30 m2
big anechoic chamber at the Faculty of Engineering of the
University of Porto (FEUP), which provides a multipath-
and interference-free environment. The anechoic chamber
is shown in Figure 9(a). In the following, we first give a
detailed overview of the experimental design for these indoor
measurements and later present our results.
A. Indoor Experimental Setup
We characterize the receiver response in terms of the
average packet delivery rate (PDR) in the presence of various
jamming profiles. Inside the chamber, we placed the antenna
of the transmitting 802.11p device on a pole. The jammer
antenna was placed on a second pole, while the antenna
of the receiving device was located on a box at a similar
height. The actual devices were placed outside the chamber
and connected to the antennas via cables. Next, we started
with the transmission of payload packets from the transmitter
to the receiver. These packets had a size of 100 Byte and
were transmitted with the QPSK modulation at a rate of
6 Mbit/s. Overall, one such packet occupies the channel for
232 µs. These packets were generated at a rate of 100 packets
per second. Hence, the wireless medium was idle most of
the time with respect to 802.11p transmissions. All received
packets were recorded by an application and the resulting
traces were used to compute PDR and the reported RSSI
from the receiver. Every measurement point was computed
as the average PDR across a series of 104 packets. For more
details on the setup of transmitter, receiver, and jammer,
(a) Experiment setup in the anechoic chamber.
Attenuators
56.79 dB
46.29 dB56.36 dB
3.80 m
1.20 m
4.30 m
Jammer
Transmitter
Receiver
(b) Path loss attenuation and distance between nodes.
Fig. 9. Indoor measurement environment.
we refer to Table II. We focused on the topology shown
in Figure 9(b), and we additionally varied the attenuation of
the jamming signal through the addition of RF attenuators.
The signal and interference power at the receiver, as well as
the resulting SINR values, are shown in Table III.
B. Calibration
Our 802.11p devices report an RSSI value for each
successfully decoded packet. This RSSI value is designed to
indicate the strength of the received signal in comparison to
the anticipated noise floor, see Section II-B3. To simplify the
analysis of the RSSI, especially when deducting the average
received power strength from it, we initially performed a set
of calibration measurements. We describe here the procedure
used to obtain (1) the relationship between the transmit
power set in software to the actual power of the transmitted
signal and (2) the mapping between RSSI (in dB) and the
actual received power (in dBm) above the noise floor.
1) Calibration of the Transmit Power: We carried out
this calibration by connecting the transmitter to a spectrum
analyzer through a coaxial cable with 2 dB attenuation.
Because we were measuring a pulsed modulated OFDM
signal, the energy of each subcarrier varies from symbol
to symbol. It is known that measuring the power of an
OFDM signal is a challenging task [32]. Figure 11 shows a
transmitted 802.11p frame in the time domain as captured
by the spectrum analyzer. The figure illustrates the high
variance of power levels within the OFDM transmission.
We used the maxhold function of the spectrum analyzer to
obtain the average power over the signal bandwidth across a
sequence of 103 packets transmitted with QPSK modulation
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802.11 Device
Data rate 6 Mbit/s (QPSK 1/2)
Ptx 17.48 dBm
Payload length 100 Byte (232 µs)
Packet generation rate 100 [packets/s]
Constant Jammer ON-phase / OFF-phase 2.71 ms / 10 µs
Periodic Jammer ON-phase / OFF-phase 64 µs / 10 µs
Reactive Jammer
(12 µs, 47 µs)
(12 µs, 64 µs)
(12 µs, 500 µs)
(16 µs, 500 µs)
(40 µs, 500 µs)
Energy detection threshold -75 dBm
General
Center frequency 5.860 GHz (Ch. 172)
Jammer Power 16.75 dBm
TABLE II
Setup parameters used in all our indoor experiments.
PT x−Rx [dBm] PT x−J [dBm] Att. [dB] PJ−Rxconst. [dBm] PJ−Rx react. [dBm] SINRconst. [dB] SINRreact. [dB]
-38.9 -103.3 64 -94 – 55 57
-38.9 -95.3 56 -86 – 47 57
-38.9 -83.3 44 -74 – 35 57
-38.9 -73.3 34 -64 -64 25 25
-38.9 -63.3 24 -54 -54 15 15
-38.9 -58.3 19 -49 -49 10 10
TABLE III
Power and Attenuation Settings in Anechoic Chamber
that were carrying random payload. This method is con-
sidered in [32] as one of the most accurate approaches for
measuring the power of an OFDM signal. In Figure 10(a) we
show the resulting relationship obtained from the calibration
measurement. Every point in the graph corresponds to a
single value obtained using the previous method. We observe
slight deviations from a linear relationship at the lowest
and highest power values, while a linear behavior can be
observed for the range from 9 to 16 dBm. When driven at full
gain the measured power corresponds to 17.58 dBm, which
is the configuration used in all our experiments. Note that
the maximum power reported in the datasheet of the device
is 21 dBm. Based on the measured values for the transmit
power, we then proceeded to determine the mapping between
RSSI and signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR).
2) Calibration of the RSSI: We connected transmitter and
receiver via a coaxial cable (2 dB attenuation) and increased
the attenuation between them step-wise by adding passive
attenuator elements. This allowed us to precisely estimate
the received signal power. Simultaneously, we recorded the
average RSSI for a sequence of 104 packets. Figure 10(b)
shows the data samples obtained in the experiments and
a linear and cubic fitting model for that data. Due to the
lower complexity and high accuracy of the linear model,
we use it for mapping RSSI samples σ to received power
values γ (in dBm): γ = 0.856 ·σ− 86.35. By assuming the
noise power equal to the receiver sensitivity (i.e., -86 dBm)
and adding it to the estimated received power, we convert
all RSSI values to SINR throughout the experiments. With
respect to the receiver sensitivity, we never obtained RSSI
values lower than -86 dBm after the above conversion on any
received packet. Hence, we consider the receiver sensitivity
to be -86 dBm. This is in accordance with discussions in the
Madwifi mailing list [33] stating that the freeware version of
the driver sets the card sensitivity to 10 dB higher than the
commercial version. However, we suspect that the lack of
RSSI reports below -86 dBm are in fact a limitation of the
driver and not of the hardware itself. In Subsection III-D
we conduct measurements that suggest that the hardware
provides a sensitivity of -96 dBm, while the driver reports
could be erroneous by 10 dB.
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(a) Mapping the transmit power value set in software to
the measured power.
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(b) Mapping RSSI to received power.
Fig. 10. Fig. 10(a) shows measured transmit power values for various
transmit power settings on the considered 802.11p devices. Fig. 10(b) shows
RSSI values and the corresponding (measured) received power. We compare
a linear and a third degree polynomial (i.e., cubic) fitting. The first yields an
RMS error of 1.96, while the latter slightly reduces the error to 1.79. Due to
the lower complexity of the linear model and the comparable accuracy, we
select the least square linear model over more complex fitting models. The
chosen model is given by: Prx = 0.856 · RSSI - 86.35 in dBm. Assuming
a noise floor of about -86 dBm, the corresponding SINR can be obtained
as: SINR = 0.856 · RSSI.
Preamble
Payload
Fig. 11. Transmitted 802.11p frame captured by the spectrum analyzer.
The representation in the time domain shows that the preamble features
stable power levels, while the OFDM signal (i.e., PLCP, MAC, and WSMP
headers, as well as payload) exhibits irregular power patterns.
C. Measurement Results - Reactive Jammer
In the following, we present measurement results regard-
ing the impact of reactive jamming on the performance of
802.11p communications. For that, we show (in Figure 12)
the packet delivery ratio (PDR) for different SINR values,
which are achieved by adding/removing passive attenuators
to/from the RF output of the jammer device. Every depicted
point corresponds to the average PDR value across a se-
quence of 104 packets. In addition, we compute the 95%
confidence intervals, but do not show them in the figures as
they are below 1%. Small fluctuations of PDR and RSSI
within a measurement are shown in Figure 13(a), where
every depicted point corresponds to the average performance
over 50 packet transmissions. As highlighted in Table III,
a higher attenuation results in a lower interference power
PJ−Rx and, thus, in a higher SINR and vice versa. On the
other hand, the received signal strength of 802.11p data
packets PT x−Rx was kept constant for all measured points.
We considered several reactive jamming strategies, which
are characterized by different reaction delays and signal
durations as illustrated in Figure 7. Note that the reactive
jammer is triggered by legitimate transmissions only if the
sensed power is above -75 dBm, which happens when the
applied attenuation is below 36 dB, see Table III. In that case,
the jammer is not active and the legitimate communication is
only disturbed by noise, which results in an SINR of 57 dB.
a) Impact of Reaction Delay: Figure 12(a) shows the
PDR performance under the impact of the reactive jam-
mer. In particular, we consider reaction delays of 12, 16,
and 40 µs and the interference signal has a fixed length
of 500 µs. Recall that this jamming configuration sends a
new signal when energy is sensed, however, only once per
detected 802.11p packet. For comparison, we also show the
performance that is achieved when the jammer is disabled
and observe that the communication is significantly impaired
by all reactive jammer patterns. Specifically, 10 dB stronger
signals are required to fully overcome the jammer. It can
be further observed that a slight increase in reaction delay
results in a significantly lower jammer effectiveness. For
instance, the PDR improves by up to 2 dB when the jammer
requires 16 µs to react instead of 12 µs. These additional 4 µs
are particularly important as they correspond to the short
training symbols (t8-t10) used for the coarse correction of
frequency and time offsets, see Figure 8. Finally, a jammer
that reacts with a delay of 40 µs misses the preamble and the
PLCP header and has an up to 3.5 dB lower effectiveness.
b) Impact of Interference Duration: In Figure 12(b)
we study the impact of the interference duration. For this,
we consider the reactive jammer with 12 µs delay and three
different durations, namely 47, 64, and 500 µs. As expected,
the longer the interference, the more damage is inflicted on
the communication success. However, reducing the interfer-
ence signal from 500 to 64 µs has a negligible impact on the
jammer effectiveness. Since the jammer already interferes
the control information, only marginal gain is obtained from
further interfering the payload part. However, an interference
duration of 47 µs partially misses the MAC header and leads
to a slightly lower effectiveness. In the selected configuration
and for all the considered patterns, the impact of the reactive
jammer degrades the 802.11p performance by at least 10 dB.
When the signal of interest is 17 dB stronger than the reactive
interference, the impact of the latter can be neglected. We
conducted further measurements that consistently confirmed
a 100% PDR under higher SINR conditions.
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(a) Impact of the reaction delay.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 180
20
40
60
80
100
SINR [dB]
P
D
R
 [
%
]
 
 
(12 µs, 64 µs)
(12 µs, 47 µs)
(12 µs, 500 µs)
No Jammer
(b) Impact of the signal length.
Fig. 12. Characterizing the impact of reaction delay and interference signal
length on the effectiveness of the jammer. The reaction delay is a very
important factor, as we observe that few microseconds larger delays result
in a significantly lower jamming effectiveness. In contrast, the length of the
interference signal has a limited impact on the performance. Important for
the jammer is to interfere the preamble and relevant control information,
e.g., PLCP and MAC headers. Prolonging the interference signal to also
overlap with the payload does not increase the jammer effectiveness.
D. Measurement Results - Constant and Periodic Jammer
In contrast to the reactive jammer, constant and periodic
interference signals do, most of the time, not overlap with
the signals of interest and can be detected by the receiver as
signals that do not comply with the standard. As introduced
in Section II-B2, commodity WLAN devices are usually
equipped with proprietary techniques to fight interference
and can take advantage of identifying the presence of RF
jamming signals. These interference mitigation algorithms
require, however, a certain amount of time to converge.
Therefore, the resulting performance in the presence of a
jammer largely depends on whether the algorithms are still
iterating or have already converged, which is highlighted
by Figure 13(b). We differentiate between these two states
and show the average PDR performance obtained during the
initial transient and during the steady state, respectively. We
define the initial transient as the time required by the receiver
to bring the measured PDR to a stable value, which we
observed to be typically in the range of 10 to 30 seconds.
Correspondingly, we define the steady state as the time span
where no appreciable PDR fluctuations are measured.
Initial Transient: Figure 14(a) shows the obtained PDR
during the initial transient in the presence of the constant
and periodic jammers. For comparison we also show the
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
−41
−40
−39
−38
−37
−36
R
SS
I (d
Bm
)
Time (seconds)
0
25
50
75
100
P
D
R
 (
%
)
(a) Reactive jammer (12 µs, 500 µs) at SINR of 14 dB.
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(b) Constant jammer at SINR of 21 dB.
Fig. 13. Time evolution of the PDR and RSSI values measured in the
anechoic chamber.
performance obtained when the jammer is switched off and
in the presence of the reactive jammer (40 µs, 500 µs). The
results show the average PDR obtained over 104 packet
transmissions. Again, the 95% confidence intervals were
below 1% for most of the considered points2. The small
fluctuations of the PDR in the time domain are illustrated in
Figure 13(b). In the low SINR range, both the constant and
periodic jammer are more effective than the reactive jammer
by 3 and 7 dB, respectively. For higher SINR values, the
constant and periodic jammer reduce the PDR to 0% after
the nodes have reached a performance peak at 17 and 21 dB,
respectively. We later discuss the reasons for this initially
striking observation that the PDR decreases as the signal
strength increases. The SINR range over which successful
communication is completely blocked spans 18 dB in both
cases. In the following we refer to this situation of consis-
tently having a PDR of 0% under good signal conditions as
blackout phase. Perfect communication (i.e., 100% PDR) is
achieved at an SINR of 40 dB in the case of the constant
jammer. The periodic jammer is significantly more effective
and it blocks perfect communication up to 56 dB SINR.
Steady State: Once the algorithms for interference mitiga-
tion have converged, the resulting PDR changes significantly,
as shown in Figure 14(b), which confirms the benefits
of Atheros proprietary algorithms against interference. For
instance, in the presence of the constant jammer the blackout
phase completely disappears and the overall jammer effec-
tiveness is comparable to the one of the reactive jammer.
2The only exception in the initial transient phase corresponds to the PDR
measured under the periodic jammer at 46 dB SINR, where we obtained a
confidence interval of 3.54%.
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(a) Average PDR obtained during the initial transient.
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(b) Average PDR obtained in the steady state.
Fig. 14. PDR performance in the presence of constant and periodic
jammers during initial transient and steady state.
These results indicate that the interference mitigation algo-
rithms allow the receiver to synchronize to incoming signals
of interest and avoid being triggered by constant jamming
signals. In the presence of the periodic jammer, the PDR
increases remarkably in the low and mid SINR range, but
the blackout phase covers the same SINR range as previously
observed. Satisfactory performance is achieved at an SNR
of 45 dB and perfect communication only when the SINR
reaches 56 dB. Again, the 95% confidence intervals were
below 1% for most of the considered points3.
Blackout Phase: In the following, we elaborate on the ra-
tionale behind the observed blackout phase, focusing mainly
on the steady state. In Figure 14(b), at an SINR of 21 dB
the interference signal reaches the receiver with a power of
−60 dBm, cf. Table III. This value is above the coarse high
threshold and forces the receiver to perform a quick gain
drop, as discussed in Section II-B1. This gain correction
allows subsequent signals of interest (with a power of
−38.9 dBm) to arrive within the range of the A/D converter
without causing an overflow of the dynamic range [9].
If the jammer is further attenuated (i.e., for SINR values
larger than 21 dB), then the interference signal reaches the
receiver with a power that is below the coarse-high threshold,
hence, no gain correction is performed. Next, if a signal of
3The only exceptions correspond to the PDR measured under the
constant jammer at 11 dB SINR, which has confidence intervals of 1.38%.
Furthermore, under the periodic jammer at 17 dB and 46 dB SINR we obtain
confidence intervals of 3.29% and 3.54%, respectively.
interest arrives while the receiver is busy trying to decode
the interference signal, the gain cannot be set appropriately
and timely, which results in an overflow at the input of the
A/D converter. This causes the observed decrease in PDR for
an increasing SINR, which is highlighted by Figure 14(b),
specifically in the SINR range from 21 dB to 44 dB.
The effectiveness of an RF jammer, especially in the pres-
ence of interference-mitigation techniques, highly depends
on its ability to keep the receiver busy. In this respect,
there are major differences between the constant and the
periodic jammer considered in this work. This is mainly
due to the weak signal detection procedure described in
Section II-B1. Specifically, the constant jammer can trigger
weak signal detection once per interference signal due to
the initial preamble. Afterwards, weak signal detection is
no longer triggered, since the random content carried by
the interference packet is unlikely to self-correlate. Hence,
the receiver is idle and can suitably perform AGC and
synchronize with subsequent signals of interest, resulting
in a satisfactory performance, see Figure 14(b). In contrast,
the periodic interference transmits preambles about 50% of
the time, thereby triggering weak signal detection at the
receiver. Subsequent signals of interest induce a sudden
increase in received power, so that the receiver tries to
identify a valid signal. However, this happens without a
prior adaptation of the gain. Therefore, the high incoming
power of the legitimate signal falls outside the preferred
A/D dynamic range and the receiver cannot extract the
user information. This leads to the initially counterintuitive
behaviour of observing a decreasing PDR for an increasing
SINR as shown in Figure 14(b).
Finally, a PDR of 100% is reached at an SINR of 56 dB,
that is, when the interference power is close to -96 dBm. At
this point, the incoming power of the jamming signal does
no longer trigger weak signal detection nor does it degrade
the signal quality. Based on these results, we suspect that the
sensitivity of our 802.11p devices corresponds to -96 dBm,
as mentioned in Section III-B2.
Final Observations: There are three major observations
that can be concluded from the results so far:
• The authors in [9] observed that an interference sig-
nal 20-30 dB weaker than the signal of interest can
effectively disturb 802.11 transmissions. In our mea-
surements we find that a periodic signal with a very
high on/off rate and a preamble structure, can seriously
hamper an 802.11p transmission despite being up to
56 dB weaker than the legitimate signal. Extrapolated
to an outdoor environment, this means that a jammer
located significantly far away from two communicating
vehicles (that are close to each other) can still be very
effective. We confirm this hypothesis in Section V.
• In the steady state, a periodic jammer can achieve a
significantly better performance than a constant jam-
mer, while the latter has a similar effectiveness as the
reactive jammer. However, during the initial transient,
constant and periodic jammers block communication in
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a similar way. The performance of 802.11p devices in
the presence of a jammer is particularly vulnerable to
preamble-like structures that reach high levels of self-
correlation and trigger (at least) weak signal detection
events at the receiver.
• State-of-the-art 802.11 devices perform a set of adapta-
tion techniques in the presence of non-reactive interfer-
ence that have the potential of improving the commu-
nication performance. Reducing the convergence time
of such techniques could increase their applicability for
802.11p vehicular networks by better adapting to highly
dynamic vehicular environments.
IV. Modelling the Impact of RF Jamming in a Generic
VANET Scenario
In the previous section, we measured and analyzed the
performance of 802.11p hardware in the presence of RF
jamming in an anechoic chamber void of multipath propa-
gation effects and influence of any external RF interference.
We obtained a relationship between the PDR and the SINR
in the presence of various jammer types. The results are
VANET-specific in the sense that the hardware used is a
reference implementation of the 802.11p amendment. In this
section, we propose a method that uses those results as
a model to study the impact of RF jamming on VANET
communications in a generic setting. The method takes as
input the positions of transmitter, receiver, and jammer,
propagation models for the considered environment, and the
PDR versus SINR results. The different steps are described
as follows:
1) Obtain the distance from transmitter and jammer to
the receiver.
2) Calculate the received power from the transmitter
signal PT,Rx and from the jammer signal PJ,Rx,
PX,Rx =
PX,Tx ·GX,Tx ·GX,Rx
aX
, for X = {T,J}, (1)
where GX,Tx and GX,Rx are the transmitter and receiver
antenna gains, the attenuation aX is obtained using
propagation models suitable for the environment under
consideration, and PX,Tx is the transmitted power.
PX,Rx and PX,Tx are given in mW.
3) Calculate the SINR as 10log10
(
PT,Rx
PJ,Rx + N
)
[dB],
where N is the noise floor. The variables are given
in mW.
4) Finally, obtain the corresponding PDR at the calcu-
lated SINR using the indoor results.
In the remainder of this section we validate this method
through outdoor measurements.
A. Outdoor Scenario Characterization
The scenario selected for the validation measurements is a
rural area located in the periphery of Aachen in Germany, see
Figure 15. This scenario provides two perpendicular roads. A
main road that has a length of 600 m and a 120 m long side
Fig. 15. Satellite view of the scenario. In the basic topology, the jammer
and the transmitter are static at the indicated positions, while the receiver
is placed at different positions along the main road. The different positions
of the receiver result in a varying received power from both transmitter
and jammer. The terrain features a certain degree of inclination. The graph
provides information about the ground height at three specific positions.
road. The line-of-sight along the main road (about 300 m)
is shorter than the total length of the latter due to a slight
descending slope of the road. Furthermore, the area between
main road and side road exhibits a moderate elevation of the
ground that can block line-of-sight along the diagonal path
between both roads. The amount of traffic in the area is
negligible with only few sporadic cars.
This open space scenario offers a low dispersive propa-
gation environment, as there are no obstacles or buildings
between or surrounding the vehicles. Therefore, shadowing,
scattering, and reflection of the signals are expected to have
a negligible impact on the performance. Hence, we select
the Friis path loss model [34] to be an adequate abstraction
of the propagation environment and use it to model the
signal attenuations in Equation 1. The model assumes a
logarithmic decay of the received power with increasing
propagation distance. Due to the existing terrain asymmetries
in the considered scenario, we characterize the path loss
attenuation individually along the main road, side road, and
along the diagonal connecting both roads. For estimating
the path loss attenuation along the main and side road, the
transmitter is kept static at the crossroad and the receiver
moves along the corresponding road, respectively. Similarly,
for estimating the attenuation along the diagonal path, the
transmitter is static at the end of the side street (about
120 m away from the crossroad), while the receiver moves
along the main road. To obtain samples of the received
signal strength, we let transmitter and receiver communicate
with the jammer switched off. In every measurement, the
transmitter sends packets to the receiver at a rate of 100
packets per second for roughly 2 minutes. Transmission
power, modulation, and packet format are the same as for the
indoor measurements, cf. Table II. We compute the distances
between the devices from their reported GPS positions, and
use the signal strength values reported by the receiver and
mapped according to the calibration results of Section III-B.
Next, we obtain estimates of the model parameters by least
squares fitting the measured distance and signal strength
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Scenario Path loss model RMSE
Main road Pr = −2.026 ·10log10 (d)−26.10 3.662
Side road Pr = −3.317 ·10log10 (d)−9.32 0.906
Diagonal Pr = −5.263 ·10log10 (d) + 47.47 2.113
TABLE IV
Parameterization of path loss models
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Fig. 16. Measured and expected power as function of the distance between
transmitter and receiver along the diagonal between main and side roads.
values to equation Pr(d) = k − α · 10log10 (d) in dBm. Ta-
ble IV shows the resulting path loss parameterization and the
respective root mean square error (RMSE) obtained for each
communication path. The parameterization for the diagonal
path is out of the expectable range for such an environment,
most likely due to the aforementioned terrain elevation.
Nevertheless, Figure 16 shows that the model fits well the
measured received power values. In the following we use
the propagation models shown in Table IV to determine the
expected received power of the transmitter and the jammer
at the receiver.
B. Measurement Results
We conduct measurements in the previous scenario to
validate the proposed method for modeling the impact of RF
jamming on VANET communications. First, we describe the
node topology and provide some details about the measure-
ment methodology. Afterwards we present the results.
Setup and Methodology: We place the jammer at the end
of the side street and the transmitter at the crossroad. The
receiver is placed at different positions along the main road,
as shown in Figure 15. The different node configurations
result in varying SINR values. For every receiver position,
the transmitter sends packets to the receiver at a rate of
100 packets per second over 2 minutes. This procedure is
repeated for a representative subset of the available jam-
ming patterns, namely constant, periodic, and two reactive
jammers with a signal length of 500 µs and reaction delays
of 12 and 40 µs, respectively. While processing the data,
we differentiate between initial transient and steady state for
the constant and periodic jammers. Notice that the results
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Fig. 17. Real PDR as function of the SINR for the reactive jammers.
presented in this section refer exclusively to the performance
obtained during the steady state. Each graph shows the
measured PDR and the predicted PDR using the proposed
model. For comparison we also show the PDR performance
obtained when the jammer is switched off.
Reactive Jammer: Figures 17(a) and 17(b) show the PDR
obtained in the presence of the reactive jammers. The figure
shows the average PDR and the 95% confidence intervals.
As opposed to the results obtained in the anechoic chamber,
the PDR measured outdoors exhibited moderate fluctuations
for a given SINR point due to the higher signal strength
variability expected in an uncontrolled propagation environ-
ment. In both cases, the performance predicted by the model
follows closely the PDR measured outdoors. The shape of
both curves is similar, despite an SINR offset of 1-2 dB.
Constant and Periodic Jammer: Figure 18(a) shows the
performance obtained in the presence of the constant jam-
mer. The measured PDR follows the shape of the predicted
graph, despite what seems to be an outlier at 11 dB SINR
and a slight overestimation of the PDR for higher SINR
values. Figure 18(b) confirms the presence of the blackout
phase caused by the periodic jammer, since we consistently
measured a PDR of 0% for SINR values below 57 dB.
C. Final Observations
In general, the presented results show that the performance
of outdoor communication under jamming can be well
approximated by applying the method proposed at the begin-
ning of the section. This procedure empowers the community
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Fig. 18. Real PDR as function of the SINR for the constant and periodic
jammer.
to use the models to characterize VANET communications
in the presence of a jammer and perform jamming-aware
design of VANET applications and protocols.
While the validation and accuracy of our method has been
exclusively evaluated in open space environments, we do
not anticipate fundamental issues that limit its applicability
in urban environments. We underline that the accuracy of
the prediction is mostly dependent on the characterization
of the propagation environment, that is, on an appropriate
choice and calibration of the propagation model. However, in
urban environments this is a challenging task, as shadowing
and multi-path fading lead to signal strength fluctuations
around the average value predicted by the path loss model.
The stochastic nature of these processes can be hardly
predicted and affects both legitimate and interference signals.
Consequently, the instantaneous SINR fluctuates and so does
the quality of the communication. Under highly variable
conditions, our model can nevertheless be used to provide
bounds of expectable performance given an educated guess
regarding the magnitude of the signal strength fluctuations.
We have implemented and validated the model in ns3 [35]
using the data from our previous work [8]. The simulation
model for ns3 can be downloaded from [36] for experimen-
tation and further development.
V. Outdoor Platooning Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the quality of the commu-
nication between two vehicles moving as a platoon in the
presence of an RF jammer. The platooning movement is
characterized by a short and constant inter-vehicle distance
and the same acceleration and speed across vehicles [37].
Platoons are intended to increase traffic efficiency, but they
are vulnerable to jamming attacks. If the platoon is coor-
dinated by a VANET connection, even short disruptions of
the communication can have fatal consequences. For this
study, we choose the same open space environment as in
Section IV and an additional scenario, namely the large
parking lot near the seafront in Porto used in our previous
work [8]. For convenience, we name these scenarios rural
and seafront. In the following, we provide a description of
the environment and the setup for each scenario, and present
the corresponding results.
A. Rural Environment
We place the jammer at the crossroads between the main
and the side roads. The exact position is highlighted with a
fire symbol in Figure 19. The communicating vehicles move
at a constant speed of about 25 km/h along the main road,
where they first approach the crossroad and later leave the
jammed area. Note that, depending on the jamming signal,
the vehicles start off at different positions. Specifically, in
the presence of the constant and the periodic jammers the
starting point is located far enough from the jammer to ini-
tially enable successful communication, while the required
distance is shorter in the presence of the reactive jammer.
Starting and ending points are highlighted in Figure 19
as well. In our measurements, the transmitter is closely
followed by the receiver keeping an inter-vehicle distance
of about 5 m. In this scenario, we evaluate the impact of
constant, periodic, and two reactive jammers. Note that
the relatively low moving speed is not expected to have a
fundamental impact on the results, as mobility alone does
not alter the characteristics of the propagation environment.
However, higher speeds would affect the results, as both
SINR and PDR would fluctuate over shorter time scales and
so the transition phases in the performance would be steeper.
From a geographical perspective though, the results are not
expected to exhibit any substantial difference.
1) Results: Figure 19 illustrates the threat that an RF
jammer (constant and reactive in this case) poses to a
vehicular platoon. The areas over which communication is
successful are highlighted in green4. Whenever the com-
munication is completely disrupted (PDR equals 0%) there
is no color being displayed. Figure 19(a) shows that the
constant jammer effectively blocks the communication along
the main road. Specifically, over a length of 465 m no single
packet is successfully received. Normal operation is only
possible when the vehicles are significantly far away from
the jammer. Similarly, Figure 19(b) shows that the impact of
the reactive jammer is significantly lower, since the blackout
area spans only over a road segment of 70 m with the
4In fact, the color changes as function of the measured signal strength. As
the transmission distance is almost constant, the measured signal strength
fluctuates only slightly within certain bounds that are mapped to the green
color.
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(a) Constant jammer.
(b) Reactive (12 µs, 500 µs) jammer.
Fig. 19. Satellite view of the rural scenario during the platooning mea-
surements. The jammer is static at the indicated position, while transmitter
and receiver move along the main road. Hence, the vehicles first approach
the crossroad and then leave the jammed area. Successful communication
is indicated by colored regions. The range of the blackout area is explicitly
delimited with parentheses.
jammer at its center. The indoor measurements of Section III
indicate that, once the adaptive mechanisms of the 802.11p
devices have converged, both constant and reactive jammer
have a comparable impact on the communication. Outdoors,
however, we observe major differences in the effectiveness
of these two jamming signals. Therefore, the constant jam-
mer effectiveness obtained during the initial transient, see
Figure 14(a), should be rather considered for predicting the
achievable performance in the platoon configuration. This
can be explained by the changes in topology and propagation
conditions as the vehicles move, since in this situation
of continuous change the 802.11p devices have difficulties
setting their working point within the steady state.
In the following, we show the time evolution of the
PDR in the presence of the considered jamming signals.
In addition, we superpose the behavior of the predicted
SINR, that is, the SINR computed based on the position
of the vehicles and the jammer and the path loss model.
Specifically, we consider the path loss model for the main
road as defined in Section IV-A.
In Figure 20, it can be observed that the temporal behavior
of PDR and SINR is similar for both reactive jammers.
Only when the platoon is close to the jammer, a complete
disruption of the communication occurs. The transition be-
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(a) Platooning movement and reactive (12 µs, 500 µs) jammer.
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(b) Platooning movement and reactive (40 µs, 500 µs) jammer.
Fig. 20. Platooning movement under the impact of the reactive jammer.
The predicted PDR values are obtained by means of the model derived
based on the indoor measurements.
tween a PDR of 100% and 0% (and vice versa) lasts for
5 s, which at the speed of travel corresponds to 35 m. The
blackout area is in both cases of similar length, namely 10 s
or 70 m. During the transition time a jamming detection
strategy could extract and exploit important information
from correctly received packets (RSSI, relative position of
the nodes, PDR, among others) that could reveal the presence
of a jammer as proposed, e.g., in [27]. This information
may no longer be available when the PDR drops to 0%
and jamming detection strategies may perform significantly
worse or simply fail. The model used to map SINR to PDR
shows a very good agreement with the actual measured
performance. Despite the mobility of the nodes, the proposed
approach can be applied to accurately model the impact
of reactive jamming on VANET platooning in specific, and
VANET communications in general.
Figure 21 shows that the blackout area is significantly
larger around the crossroad in the presence of constant and
periodic jammers compared to the reactive ones. Basically,
both jammers exhibit a similar effectiveness by completely
disrupting the communication over more than 450 m as
shown in Figure 19(a)5. In both cases the transition time
spans 15 s. The model introduced in Section IV to predict
the resulting PDR is again used in Figure 21. In the
presence of pro-active jammers, modeling the PDR in a
scenario with mobility is considerably more complex than
in the case of reactive jammers, which is reflected by a
noticeable mismatch between predicted and measured PDR.
5Although the periodic jammer seems to disrupt the communication over
a larger region than the constant jammer, this is mainly caused by a slightly
lower speed of travel that prolongs the exposure time to the periodic jammer.
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(a) Platooning movement and constant jammer.
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(b) Platooning movement and periodic jammer.
Fig. 21. Platooning movement under the impact of the constant and
periodic jammer. The predicted PDR values are obtained by means of
the model derived based on the indoor measurements and differentiating
between initial transient and steady state.
In Section III, we have shown that the 802.11p devices
require a certain time (initial transient) before the adaptation
mechanisms settle at a robust working point (steady state).
In the indoor measurements we measured convergence times
up to 30 s. However, in outdoor scenarios with mobility it
can be expected that the initial transient spans even larger
periods. In the following, we show results for the predicted
PDR based on both, initial transient and steady state values
presented in Section III. In Figure 21(a) it can be observed
that the initial phase provides a good match for the PDR
performance obtained while the cars approach the jammer.
When the cars leave the crossroads, that is, move away
from the jammed area, the PDR prediction is improved by
using the steady state values. Unfortunately, we are not
able to determine the instant that separates initial phase
from steady state. We believe that the mismatches between
measured and predicted PDR are rather a consequence of
the complex algorithms featured by the Atheros cards, than
a fundamental problem with our modeling methodology.
Figure 21(b) presents similar results obtained in the presence
of the periodic jammer. Again, the performance during the
initial phase shows an acceptable match for the measured
PDR when the vehicles approach the jammer. When they
move away, the steady state is a better option.
B. Seafront Environment
This scenario consists of a 500 m long parking lot near the
seafront in Leça da Palmeira in the outskirts of Porto, see
Figure 22(a). Due to the uniformity of the characteristics of
the terrain and open space environment between the devices,
(a) Geographic and topology details.
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(b) PDR and SINR temporal evolution.
Fig. 22. Platooning movement under the impact of the periodic jammer
in the seafront scenario.
we obtain a single propagation model for this scenario with
an RMSE of 3.932 [35]. The jammer, marked with a fire
symbol on the figure, is located 180 m from the north end
of the parking lot and slightly over 300 m from the south end.
During the measurements, few vehicles sporadically drove
by at speeds up to 60 km/h along a parallel street located
30 m away from the measurement area. In this scenario, we
consider a periodic jammer and a reactive jammer6.
1) Results: A geographic visualization of the commu-
nication performance is illustrated in Figure 22(a), while
Figure 22(b) shows the time evolution of PDR and SINR in
the presence of the periodic jammer. It can be observed that
the SINR decreases very fast within the first 15 s due to the
increasing interference caused by the jammer. Shortly after
leaving the north end until 80 m behind the jammer (towards
the south end), the communication is completely blocked.
The jammer creates a blackout area of about 250 m, which
corresponds to 45 s at the speed of travel (about 20 km/h).
While turning at the end of the parking lot, both vehicles
can communicate again for nearly 20 s (range from 60 to
80 s). From there, they return to the north end experiencing
again a large communication blackout around the jammer.
We conduct the same measurements with the reactive
jammer. SINR and PDR are shown in Figure 23(b) and
a geographic visualization is given in Figure 23(a). Recall
that for the reactive jammer to be active it must first detect
the transmitter. Then, to be able to impair packet delivery,
it must also create sufficient interference power at the
6The reactive jammer has a slightly different pattern than the reactive
jammers considered so far. It transmits a 64 µs long signal after a delay of
16 µs. From the measurements of Section III (Fig. 12) only slight differences
in the jammer effectiveness are expected.
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(a) Geographic and topology details.
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Fig. 23. Platooning movement under impact of the reactive jammer (16 µs,
500 µs) in the seafront scenario.
receiver. The communication is disrupted over 170 m in both
directions around the reactive jammer, corresponding to 30 s,
which is clearly visible in Figure 23(a). The interference
range of the reactive jammer is shorter than for the constant
jammer, namely 170 m compared to 250 m. Even though the
reactive jammer is less effective, it still causes a significant
damage to the communication in this scenario.
VI. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the only previous works
focusing on RF jamming attacks on VANETs are [8], [38],
[39]. The work in [38] presents an approach for detecting
reactive jamming in 802.11p networks, but it does not assess
the impact of RF jamming, nor does it use realistic VANET
scenarios for evaluation. The authors in [39] study, by
means of network simulations, the impact of RF jamming on
the dissemination of geocast messages. The attacker model
consists of an 802.11p device tuned as a reactive jammer that
sends a short signal upon sensing energy on the medium. The
authors show that reacting upon sensing energy above the
card sensitivity is significantly more effective (up to 20 %)
than reacting only if the sensed SNR is sufficient to decode
the incoming packet. Both attacks are able to block the
dissemination of geocast messages in a simulated two lane
highway. In a city scenario, however, the situation changes
as there are alternative paths to disseminate the messages
around the jammer. While these results are consistent with
our observations in the field measurements and with our
previous work [8], we cover a wider range of jamming signal
profiles. Furthermore, we have shown in Section III that the
behavior of real devices in the presence of RF jamming
is subject to complex performance issues. We believe that
our measurements and proposed model can help researchers
conduct realistic simulations of VANETs accounting for the
impact of RF jamming.
Additionally, there is some related work on jamming at
both MAC [40], [41] and PHY [42] for classical 802.11
WLANs. The authors in [9] study the vulnerabilities of
802.11b/g hardware to RF interference, which are associated
to timing recovery and dynamic range selection issues. The
authors consider a jammer that emits DSSS or OFDM mod-
ulated signals that do not comply with the standard and show
that weak interference (30 dB less power than the legitimate
signal) can significantly disrupt the communication by im-
peding time recovery. Our measurements show that, depend-
ing on the relative position of the nodes, a periodic jamming
signal completely blocks communication up to an SINR
of 56 dB. Particularly damaging is the case of weak signal
detection triggered by the jammer followed by an overflow
of the A/D dynamic range caused by the signal of interest.
The observation and characterization of this event further
extends the work in [9]. We also confirm the importance of
correct timing recovery and show a degradation in (reactive)
jammer effectiveness that correlates with the proportion of
preamble that is missed. The authors in [43] present results
for the error performance of 802.11b/g networks under the
influence of RF jamming. Their results show that wide-band
jamming damages OFDM-based 802.11g communications
more severely (up to 7 dB) than they affect 802.11b (spread
spectrum). The authors in [42] show that a constant wide-
band noise signal is more effective (3-4 dB) than a constant
wide-band digitally modulated signal at disrupting 802.11g
communications.
VII. Conclusion
We have described the receiver structure of a reference
802.11p implementation and characterized how different
RF jamming profiles impact the communication. Then, we
have proposed and validated, by means of measurements,
a procedure that uses the relationship between PDR and
SINR measured in a controlled environment as a model
to study the impact of RF jamming on VANET networks
and applications. Finally, we have applied the proposed
method to predict the behavior of a vehicular platoon under
the influence of jamming, and have shown that the model
provides realistic results. Furthermore, our results reveal that
RF jamming poses a serious threat to VANET safety in
general, and platooning applications in particular. In the
latter case, reactive, constant, and periodic jammers can
severely disrupt communication up to 465 m despite very
short communication distances between legitimate devices.
The significant impact of RF jamming reported in this work
highlights the need for jamming-aware communications,
protocols and applications, as well as effective jamming
detection strategies. As a first step into that direction, we
made our measurement data available for download in [10],
[11] to be used by the community as input to network
simulations and for further analysis.
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As major lines of future work, we foresee the design
of algorithms and protocols that detect and/or mitigate RF
jamming attacks, as well as warning systems that alert the
drivers about eventually malfunctioning safety applications.
Additionally, more resilient PHY designs (e.g., with more
frequent channel estimation) may increase the robustness of
VANETs to jamming. Finally, protection measures should
also be considered in system design by, for instance, imple-
menting critical functionality directly into the firmware.
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